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The paper examines the long-run relationship between demographic and macroeconomic development 
trends in the Philippines, and compares trends observed in that country to trends in eight regional 
neighbors in East and Southeast Asia.  The Philippines stands out from these countries in that 
available data suggests the country has completed its demographic transition to a much lesser extent 
than comparison countries.  Analysis of trends shows that the Philippine economy has lost ground to 
the country’s neighbors over the past 50 years, and that its unfulfilled demographic transition has 
played a key role in explaining the country’s relative economic decline.  The paper reviews 
established economic theory and a few simple counter-factual simulations to explain and support this 
conclusion.  The authors also consider the relationship between demographic trends and associated 
economic developments, and the political situation in the country.  Despite discouraging findings 
regarding the Philippines’ relative economic decline, the paper notes the country’s more favorable 
performance in social development vis-à-vis its neighbors.  The paper ends on an optimistic note, 
pointing to: recent economic reforms, the unrealized potential of a ‘demographic dividend,’ rising 
demand and use of modern family planning among Philippine households, and the favorable long run 
outlook for Philippine Overseas Contract Workers, as causes for optimism regarding future 
demographic change and the country’s economic prospects. 
 


























  1I. Introduction 
 
After showing mediocre growth rates of 3.0-4.5% during 2000-2003, the Philippine economy grew by 
6.1% in 2004, its highest rate in 15 years. The country’s Current Account has maintained a surplus 
since 1999, but widened from US$1.4 billion in 2003 to US$2.1 billion in 2004. International 
currency reserves have been maintained at a healthy level of about US$16 billion in 2003-2004, 
which is equivalent to 4-6 months of imports. Total exports increased by 14.0% in 2004 (4.4% in 
2003). Export of electronic products increased by more than 10% and accounted for a 67% share of 
total exports. Other recent good news about Philippine economy includes rising retail sales, strong 
growth in employment and remittances overseas firms outsourcing services to the Philippines, such as 
US telecom firms relocating call centers—to the country. 
Do these positive developments of recent years signal that the Philippine economy is finally 
turning around and joining the ranks of other strongly performing economics of East Asia? 
Regrettably, no, as there are equally worrying signs concerning the economy’s health and its long-
term growth prospects. The Philippine government continues to rely on persist fiscal deficits to 
finance its operations. Foreign public borrowing has reached 47.6% of total public borrowing. The 
slow pace of public enterprise reform and lingering problems in the country’s financial sector is 
making it difficult for firms in the country to secure external financing. The country’s unemployment 
rate remained high at 11.8% in 2004 (a slight increase over the 11.4% rate in 2003). Persistent high 
inflation and weakening of the national currency (P51.6 per dollar in 2002, P54.2 per dollar in 2003 
and P56.03 in 2004) are other indicators of weakness in the Philippine economy. In export marks, 
while the share of manufactured products in exports has shown an impressive increase, it has not been 
accompanied by a corresponding shift in the manufacturing share of GDP and total employment. The 
share of manufacturing in GDP has been relatively flat, declining from 25% in 1985 to 22-23% in 
2000-2003. . Similar trends are evident in employment structure: the share of agriculture in total 
employment declined from 49% in 1985 to around 37% in 2000-2003, while the share of 
manufacturing was stable—hovering around 9.5-10.0% throughout the period 1985-2003, and the 
share of services increased from 41% in 1985 to 52-53% in 2000-2003. These trends suggest that the 
  2country has begun de-industrializing before it completed industrializing, and do not bode well for 
prospects for sustained economic and employment growth in the country. 
1  
Philippine efforts to propel the country’s economy forward by attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI) face the globalizing world’s harsh reality that the it must compete against other 
developing economies in Asia (most notably China) and worldwide. Multinationals are moving 
quickly to organize increasingly multinational production processes according to the most efficient 
intra-firm organization in the region. This process of rationalization seems likely to be further 
hastened by trade liberalization under ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) and ASEAN-China 
FTA (ACFTA).
2 In this regard, the Philippines seems to be losing their production bases to China and 
Thailand among others. Industrial parks constructed in southern Luzon (Laguna, Cavite, and 
Batangas) to attract foreign manufactures are not filling available facilities as quickly as the 
government hoped despite tax incentives and other government concessions. Part of the lackluster 
performance of the southern Luzon industrial parks is due to less than satisfactory transport 
infrastructure around this area as well as broader problems stemming from poor governance and a 
lack of positive spillovers from other firms also locating their manufacturing facilities in the country.
3 
Particularly symbolic of the Philippine’s poor management of public infrastructure is the new terminal 
at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. The government completed construction of the facility two 
years ago, but it remains unopened due to legal disputes over ownership of the land upon which it was 
built. Such adverse circumstances make the Philippine economy’s recent GDP growth at more than 
6% per annum rather surprising.  
Much of the Philippine economy’s resilience despite institutional shortcomings and high rates 
of unemployment and underemployment can be attributed to sustained high levels of remittances sent 
to the country by overseas Filipinos. Overseas Contract Workers (OCWs) sent remittances estimated 
to amount to as much as 23-24% of the total export earnings during the years 2001-2003.
4 The success 
Philippine workers have had in securing employment abroad is both a blessing and a curse to the 
                                                      
1 Economic data used in this paragraph are taken from Asian Development Bank (2005; 2004). 
2 Concluded in November 2004. 
3 Information obtained from informal discussion at Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). 
4 Calculated from the balance of payment data in IMF (2005). 
  3country’s economy. On the one hand, OCWs remittances infuse the economy with foreign currency 
and provide valuable income to support families back home so provide and important social safety net 
as well as stimulating consumer demand and providing a source of capital to small family-based 
enterprises. On the other hand, migrants and OCWs—be they unskilled workers or professionals— 
seem to have become ‘role models’ for those who aspire for better lives and represent a drain of the 
competitive human resources from the economy. By providing a relatively easy channel to exit from 
the Philippine economy and its institutions, established networks of Philippine contract workers 
diffuse dissatisfaction, which viewed from one perspective is positive because it lessens political 
conflicts but from another perspective can be understood as stifling any reformist pressures. 
While the efforts of reform and improved governance being undertaken by the Arroyo 
administration are fully appreciated, the focus of this paper is to examine long-run economic and 
social trends that have brought the Philippines economy to its current state. As will be discussed in 
detail, trends indicate that in many important respects the Philippine economy has been in a state of 
relative decline compared to neighboring economies since the 1960s. Factors commonly considered as 
contributing to this decline include widespread corruption, weak public/civil institutions and poor 
governance, a high level of economic inequality, and the country’s high rate of population growth. 
This paper focuses on the last of these factors as one that most clearly distinguishes the Philippines 
from other East and Southeast Asian economies—notwithstanding the importance of the other factors. 
We argue that the Philippines’ economic decline relative to its Asian neighbors can be attributed—to 
a substantial degree—to the country’s failure to undergo a demographic transition like those that took 
place in other countries in the region. The next section gives a snapshot look at historical trends in 
economic and social indictors and provides the empirical basis for our argument. Section 3 takes a 
closer look at these trends and considers some counterfactual simulations. In this section we also 
provide some theoretical support to our argument. Section 4 considers in greater detail several of the 
trends reviewed in a cursory way in Section 2 and provides greater historical background on recorded 
trends. Section 5 concludes the paper by considering future prospects for family planning in the 
Philippines and prospects for the Philippine economy if current trends continue. Thankfully, this 
enables the paper to end a fairly positive note.  
  4II.  A Snapshot Look 
Table 1 summarizes some key social and economic statistics for eight East and Southeast Asian 
economies during their Post-WWII development years. The countries were selected as regional 
neighbors of the Philippines and because their levels of economic development were broadly 
comparable to that of the Philippines in 1960. That year, the Philippine’s GDP per capita far exceeded 
that of China, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. At the time the Philippines was rapidly expanding its 
stock of capital as indicated by the high level of capital formation per capita. Capital accumulation 
was fostered by the country’s high level of savings, which greatly surpassed average savings levels 
observed in its neighbors. The high rates of savings and capital formation per capita in the Philippines 
were associated with the country’s high average value added of industrial output per worker in 1975, 
which totaled nearly US$7,000 (valued in 1995 US$). Indicators only available in 1970 show the 
Philippines was also among the most developed countries in the region in terms of its social 
development. Its literacy rate was the highest among the economies listed, and was much higher than 
rates in China, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Judged from the perspective of these economic and social 
indicators in 1960/70, one might easily conclude that the Philippines had relatively brighter prospects 
for development than most of their neighbors. 
Table 1: East/Southeast Asian region in 1960s-1970s 
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older)/2  Men 
Wo-
men 
China     650.7     61.37        94      158 /3       37         367  52.9  35.1  37.6 
Indonesia     100.1     24.93      249        69 /4       17       3,315  56.1  40.7  42.3 
Korea      24.8     32.84   1,325      562       92       6,125    --  52.6  55.8 
Malaysia        8.4      8.22      975      208     155       6,533  58.1  52.8  55.9 
Philippines       27.1     20.67       725      672     117       6,966  81.8  51.6  55.3 
Taiwan       11.2     23.62 /2   1,618  /2      629 /5     186          --  56.9 /6 -- -- 
Thailand       27.5     12.78      465        63       81       5,357  80.2   50.6  54.8 
Vietnam       31.7     10.86 /7      185 /7        23 /8       27 /8         926   -- 42.6  46.3 
 
Notes: All figures are from 1960 unless indicated otherwise below. 
/1 Figures reflect estimates for 1975. 
/2 Figures are from 1970, the earliest year for which figures are available. 
/3 Figure is from 1978—first year this figure is reported for China in WDI. 
/4 Figure is from 1967—first year this figure is reported for Indonesia in WDI. 
/5 Figure is from 1972, the earliest year for which figures are available. 
/6 Figure is from 1956, the most proximate year for which figure is available, source: US Bureau of Census (2005). 
 /7Figure is from 1984, which is the first year this figure is reported for Vietnam in the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI). 
/8 Figure is from 1989—first year this figure is reported for Vietnam in WDI. 
 
  5Table 2 reports the same indicators summarized on Table 1 for the year 2000. Comparing 
these figures with the earlier ones starkly illustrates the relative decline of the Philippine economy vis-
à-vis its neighbors. Per capita GDP of the Philippines in 2000 was less than one-tenth of that of the 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan, as compared to about half in 1960. Per capita GDP in Malaysia and 
Thailand grew to surpass the Philippines, while China’s GDP per capita (PPP) has nearly caught up. 
Gross savings had per capita in the Philippines fell sharply, from $672 (ranked first) in 1960 to only 
$76 (ranked fourth) in 2000, at the same time most of the countries saw their average level of savings 
rise. Indonesia also suffered a fall in its gross savings per capita, but the fall was much less dramatic 
(from $69 to $56). The concurrent rise in per capita GDP and fall in savings suggests there was 
substantial capital flight from the Philippines during the period, since the marginal propensity to save 
should increase with average income. Although gross capital formation per capita in the Philippines 
nearly doubled between 1960 and 2000, the country’s ranking dropped from 3
rd to 6
th and the relative 
speed of its accumulation lagged dramatically behind that of Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
The relative fall in savings and capital formation are closely linked because either domestic savings or 
foreign investments are needed to finance capital formation, and although net foreign direct 
investment was only reported for the Philippines beginning in 1977, trends show that average net FDI 
per Filipino rose from the equivalent of $13 (2000 US $) to $24 between 1977 and 2001. This 
increase lagged far behind those registered in neighboring economies and was not nearly large enough 
to offset the country’s sharp fall in average savings. The relative decline in capital formation was 
associated with an absolute decline in the estimated value added per worker in the industrial sector. 
The Philippines was the only country among those listed where this value fell between 1960 and 
2000. In the other economies, the average value of output added per industrial worker rose by 









  6Table 2: East/Southeast Asian region in 2000 
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men 
China  1,268.9  1,046.34         825      181      302       2,249  85.2  68.6  72.0 
Indonesia     224.1     227.42      1,014        56      161       4,572  86.8  64.2  68.0 
Korea       47.3     623.79    13,199   2,575   3,435     33,906    --  69.8  76.9 
Malaysia      21.8     104.78      4,808   1,243   1,368     13,363  87.4  70.2  75.0 
Philippines      79.7       93.55      1,173        76      229       5,194  94.9  67.3  71.3 
Taiwan      22.2     176.31    13.820   3,361   3,159          --  96.0  73.6  79.3 
Thailand      62.4     171.49      2,828      347      566       8,229  95.5  66.7  71.1 
Vietnam      79.1       29.22         370        34 /1      112       1,754  92.5  66.7  72.0 
 
Note: /1 Figure is from 1997, which is the latest year this figure is reported for Vietnam in WDI.  
Data sources are the same as those in Table 1. 
 
This quick comparison of some basic economic statistics of the selected East and Southeast 
Asian economies provides a broadly pessimistic characterization of Philippines’ economic 
development over the past 40 years, but a relatively less discouraging picture emerges from review of 
social indicators. Improvements in social indicators for the Philippines have largely in line with that 
of its neighbors. Literacy and life expectancy both increased moderately (by 16% and 30%, 
respectively) between 1960 and 2000. This was about the same percentage as increases registered in 
Thailand over this period. 
 
III.  A Closer Look 
The combined population of the eight economies listed above more than doubled, between 1960 and 
2001 from growing 883 million to 1.804 billion during these years. This represented an average 
annual rate of population growth of 1.8%. However, these years saw the rate of population growth 
change markedly over time. The arrival of Green Revolution technologies in rice and other cereal 
crops and broader modernization of Asian agriculture began in the 1960s and was associated with a 
sharp upturn in the population growth rate of these countries. Population increases averaged well over 
2 percent per annum from 1963 to 1974. By early 1970s, however, most economies in the region 
began their demographic transitions and population growth rates began to fall. The overall average 
fell from 2.74% in 1971 to less than 1.5% per annum in the early 1980s. The rate hovered around 1.5-
1.75% per annum range during 1980s and into the early 1990s, before once again showing decline 
during the latest decade—falling from 1.5% in 1991 to 0.9% in 2000 and 2001.  
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Source: Authors' calculations based on U.S.Bureau of the Census: International Data Base (2005)
 
 
Figure 1 presents population trends in the eight economies previously discussed and graphs 
the rate of change in total population. The figure illustrates the general trend toward lower population 
growth over time, and all eight economies had lower population growth rates in 2001 than in 1960. 
China and Thailand display the largest declines, while the declines were most modest for Malaysia 
and the Philippines. While population growth in the Philippines has fallen over time, the country’s 
population growth rate was highest among the 8 countries each year, and its 40-year averaged was 
about equal to that of Malaysia.
5 Trends in population growth rates largely follow trends in fertility 
rates (see Figure 2). 
Considering population and fertility trends is a useful way to begin to examine demographic 
change in the Philippines and its cohort economies, but recent economic demography literature goes 
beyond simple growth-population correlations to look into the relative size of the working-age against 
dependent population and consider the dynamic impact of changes in the age distribution over time. 
For example, Kelley and Schmidt (2001) conclude that declining population growth, fertility, and 
mortality, as well as larger populations and higher densities have all spurred growth of the world 
economy over the period of 1960-95, while a decline in the growth of the working-age population has 
been the sole growth-inhibiting trend. Williamson (2001) also finds a powerful positive impact of the 
growth in the working age population on per capita GDP growth, referring to this as a demographic  
                                                      
5 Malaysia has had an active policy to promote births in response to perceived labor force needs and to counteract 
economic incentives against child rearing in this relatively modern industrialized country. 
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Source: Author's calculations based on data from World Bank (2004) and Taiwan Statistical Yearbook (2004).
 
 
dividend in the middle phase of the demographic transition. The demographic dividend is also termed 
“a demographic window of opportunity” that typically lasts 40 to 50 years before countries complete 
their transitions to low-mortality and low-fertility. Williamson argues that as much as a third of the 
“East Asian miracle” can be explained by such population dynamics. 
Table 3 shows trends of age dependency ratios (the ratio of population aged 0-14 or over 65 
against population aged 15-64) for the economies considered in this paper, which provides a simple 
portrayal of the age cooperative of countries’ populations. The age-dependency ratios for all 
economies except Philippines have seen steep declines in the last two decades and have all fallen 
below 60% by 2003. This suggests these economies have benefited from the demographic dividend. 
In contrast, the Philippines has yet to garner an equivalent demographic benefit due to its high 
dependency ratio. Alonzo et al. (2004) suggest that at the current slow pace of the decline in total 
fertility rate, the effects of population growth momentum would persist in the Philippines for another 
60 years. If the Philippines fails to hasten its slow pace in lowering fertility, the population would be 
expected to triple to from the current size to 240 million before the country’s population ceases to 
grow. 
At the heart of the differing demographic trends observed among these countries are the 
differing approaches they have taken toward family planning and population growth, which in turn,  
  9         Table 3: Age dependency ratios (%) 
 
 1980  1990 2000 2003
China  67 50 46 44 
Indonesia  78 66 56 53 
Korea  61 45 39 39 
Malaysia 76 67 61 59 
Philippines  85 79 70 67 
Taiwan  57 50 44 43 
Thailand 77 56 46 43 
Vietnam 90 78 63 56 
Data source: ADB (2004) 
 
reflect their differing socio-cultural and religious attitudes towards contraception. China and Vietnam 
have pursued aggressive state directed efforts to reduce population growth. China adopted a ‘one child 
policy’ and Vietnam a ‘two child policy’, which legally mandated family size limits and prohibited 
children in excess of the mandated figures from receiving public education or other benefits. Thailand 
underwent a ‘reproductive revolution’ in which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) took a 
leading role in changing social norms and promoting contraceptive use. It achieved marked increases 
in contraceptive prevalence and decreases in birthrates beginning in the 1970s while relying solely on 
education and contraceptive distribution. In Indonesia, the government has long taken a lead in 
promoting family planning program aimed at increasing access to contraceptives and reducing 
population growth. Malaysia adopted a policy toward increasing population in the face of economic 
disincentives to child rearing common among advanced industrialized countries. While the 
government policy has been directed toward fostering population growth, there is widespread access 
to most types of contraception in the country. In the Philippines, the largest predominantly Catholic 
country in Asia, the church’s opposition to artificial contraception has clearly played an important role 
in the country’s high fertility rate. In general, more rural or agriculturally based economies at earlier 
stages of development have higher population growth rates, while more urban based economies create 
disincentives for having large numbers of children. The Philippines’ high population growth reflects 
its level of development, its policies, as well as its social and religious beliefs.  
It could be argued that a policy of encouraging Philippine workers to seek higher paying 
employment outside the country and to send back remittances has been pursued by the various 
Philippine administrations as a rational response to demographic pressure and the social and political 
difficulty of promoting family planning aggressively. As early as 1985, Cesar Virata, a prominent 
  10Philippine economist and prime minister under Marcos administration, warned that rapid population 
growth remained the most serious problem facing the country. His fears echoed concerns by 
population experts and by academics within the Roman Catholic Church. Nonetheless, the Philippine 
Catholic community has consistently taken a pro-natal stance and supported only abstinence and the 
rhythm method as methods of family planning consistent with the Catholic faith.  
The Aquino administration (1986-92), which was able to topple the Marcos administration in 
large measure due to the support of the Catholic Church and its parishioners, stressed family planning 
as a health service rather than a means to reduce population. Nonetheless, the government met strong 
resistance to its modest efforts to expand family planning service. The conflict between a secular need 
for population control and Catholic principle became more pronounced during Ramos administration 
(1992-1998). Within weeks of the inauguration, President Ramos, a Protestant, articulated that the 
achievement of per capita income of $1,000 by 1998 would require a population growth rate below 2 
percent. He appointed Juan Flavier, a medical doctor and an advocate of family planning, as secretary 
of the Department of Health, and formulated a program that made available a range of birth control 
methods including pills, IUD, and sterilization, to couples wishing to limit their number of children. 
Catholic bishops responded by declaring “total war” on the program. The conflict over the family 
planning debate subsided by 1997 as President Ramos dampened his rhetoric to the effect that it was 
not wise to speak about birth control alone, but instead the population control had to be addressed 
under the concept of population-resources-environment balance. While population control remains a 
controversial issue in the country’s national politics, some more progressive priests and nuns that 
work among the poor in more isolated rural areas or in urban slums are reportedly often sympathetic 
to the desire of couples to limit family size and assist poor families in their family planning efforts.
6 
The Philippines is a predominantly Catholic country, but it also has large evangelical 
Christian and minority Muslim populations. Until recently, leaders from these two religious groups 
have generally been strong in their opposition to any public efforts to promote family planning in the 
                                                      
6 This paragraph draws on Youngblood (1998). 
  11county.
7  Nonetheless, there have been a number of public and NGO sector sponsored efforts to 
promote contraceptive use and encourage family planning. These efforts date back to the early 1970s 
(i.e., the Population Act of 1971). Contraceptive prevalence in the country has been increasing since 
1985—the year official statistics began recording it—although the prevalence remains the lowest (47 
percent) among the economies considered in this paper. 
 
Population growth and economic development 
The relationship between population growth and economic development is complex and has been the 
subject of voluminous literature in economics dating from the inception of the discipline. Malthus 
(1967 [1793]) theorized that populations will tend to grow to the capacity of the economy to support 
human life, and gave birth to the Malthusian economics tradition that continues to find currency more 
recently in the writings of environmentalists (e.g., Lester Brown or Garret Hardin). Solow’s (1956) 
neoclassical growth model provides the base upon which much economic theory regarding population 
and growth proceeds. In simple terms, population growth plays a key role in determining how rapidly 
an economy accumulates productive factors or resources. More rapid labor force growth lessens the 
rate at which capital per worker can increase. Savings and investment rates and the technical 
efficiency of factor use are other key factors in determining an economy’s growth rate and level under 
the Solow model. Rapid capital accumulation aided by slowed population growth seen in many East 
and Southeast Asian economies helps explain the region’s high economic growth since the 1960’s. 
The decline in population growth (demographic transition) had great effect on output per capita 
through its effect on savings, which compounded the direct effect of reduced labor force growth. 
Across the eight economies and forty years (1960-2000) considered, there was a negative (-4.25) 
correlation between change in GDP per capita and change in population and the correlation 
coefficient was statistically significant (based on an F-test).
 8 
                                                      
7 A recent exception to this generalization involves a March 2004 ‘Fatwah’ (official ruling) endorsed by 22 Muslim 
religious leaders representing Islamic religious authorities in the Philippines. This Fatwah is discussed in the final 
section of the paper. 
 
8 It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the inverse relationship 
between population and economic growth in detail. See Ray (1988), for example, for the recent discussion of the 
earlier works. Mason (1999) provides an excellent review of the vast literature examining population change and 
economic development theoretically and empirically. This paper reviews economic theory regarding the impact of 
  12Figure 3 displays the trend in per capita GDP from 1960 to 2002. It indicates Philippines’ 
relatively stronger growth in the period of 1960-82, a marked decline from 1983 to 1985, and a slower 
growth since 1985. Because the figure shows trends only to the year 2002, it does not reflect the 
recent upturn in the Philippine economy registered during the past couple of years, which was detailed 
earlier. In contrast, many of the Philippines’ neighbors have achieved rates of increase in their per 
capita GDP that are higher than the Philippine rate throughout the years shown in the figure, and 
experienced initial accelerations in their growth in GDP per capita in the mid-1980s. Related to its 
slow growth in GDP per capita, property rates in the Philippines are high. Prior to the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997, which saw poverty rise in the most heavily impacted economies, nationwide about 
38% of the Philippine population had income below the poverty line, which meant the country has 
one of the highest poverty rates in the region. Despite showing a modest improvement in the poverty 
headcount over the few years the figure is reported, the absolute number of poor has steadily risen due 
to the country’s rising population.  
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population growth on development, the family planning policy pursued in the post-WW II period, and assesses the 
contribution of slower population growth to the region’s rapid economic development progress during these years. 
He also reviews growth-accounting analysis adapted to focus on the issue of the roles of increasing capital stock and 
labor in explaining Asian economies growth experiences over roughly the period considered in this paper. 
  13Figure 4 shows what trends in Philippine GDP per capita would have been if the country’s 
population had increased at the other countries’ rates but the country’s aggregate economic growth 
rate was unchanged from actual figures. Had the population grown at the Chinese rate, the GDP per 
capita of the Philippines in 2002 would have been 52% higher than the actual figure. At the Thai 
population growth rate, it would have been 25 percent higher than the actual figure. The mean 
increase in per capita GDP that the average Filipino would have obtained is nearly 80 percent of the 
international poverty line ($1 US per day) at the Thai population growth. This simple counterfactual 
can be considered a first-order estimate that does not take account of further positive impacts on 
growth through greater savings and investment. Clearly, the estimate’s assumption that aggregate 
GDP growth would remain unchanged in the face of marked changes in population is hard to sustain. 
Proponents of the view that lower population growth fosters faster economic growth by encouraging 
savings, investment, and the adoption of labor saving technology that increase worker productivity. 
The opposing view would argue that the reduced manpower implied by lower population growth 
would lead to falling GDP as the economy faces the task of producing goods and services with fewer 
workers. Treating aggregate GDP as unchanged vis-à-vis actual GDP seeks to set a neutral position 
regarding the impact of population change on GDP growth in the simulation. 
The relationship between economic development, household income, and family decision-
making regarding childrearing can be considered in a microeconomic framework though the 
household utility optimization model. Proceeding under the assumption that families consider the 
benefits and costs of having children in choosing family size, the model has been applied to examine 
how incentives for large numbers of children change as economies develop. In the early stage of 
development, when average incomes are low, having greater numbers of children brings parents high 
relative benefits in the form of old age security and extra household income, while the opportunity 
costs of parents’ time spent on child-bearing and other indirect costs are low. As economic 
development progresses and incomes rise, lower infant mortality and the emergence of public or 
employer-based old-age social security systems lower the overall benefit of having many children at 
the same time the cost of education and the opportunity cost of parents time (particularly the mothers’ 
time) increase.  
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Philippines Philippines at China rate of popul. grwth. Philippines at Korea rate of popul. grwth.
Philippines at Taiwan rate of popul. grwth. Philippines at Thai rate of popul. grwth.
Sources: Author's calculations based on World Bank (2004), U.S. Bureau of Census International Data Base (2005), and Directorate-General of Budget,
               Republic of China (2004).
 
 
Access to reliable forms of saving that offer higher returns also tends to improve as financial 
markets and banking institutions develop along with general economic advancement. As an economy 
progresses from a rural agricultural base to a more diverse sectors wherein returns to human capital 
are higher, parents’ incentives move toward having fewer children in order to focus human capital 
investments in these children so they can secure higher future income streams. 
In a simplified static setting, the trade off between having children or consuming other goods 
or saving at a higher rate can be represented graphically. In Figure 5, suppose an initial equilibrium is 
represented by point A, where household utility is maximized given the relative price between 
commodities/savings and children (represented by line a). In the figure, the price of children can be 
understood as including both direct and indirect costs of childrearing. A demographic transition from 
the second (high birth rate and low mortality rate) to third phase (low birth rate and low mortality 
rate) can be represented in the graph as an increase in the opportunity cost of childrearing and an 
increase in total household income. The effect of the former is represented by a rotation of the budget 
line from a to b, and the latter as an outward parallel shift in the budget line from b to c. Household 
preferences for different combination of children and commodities/savings are represented by the 
convex indifference curves in the figure. The point of tangency between the budget line and the 
indifference curve gives the optimal mix of children and commodities/savings. If the income effect is 
  15not too large, the household would typically desire to have a fewer number of children and consume a 
greater quantity of commodities (moving from point A to point C) as a result of the economy’s 
advancement. The rotation of the budget line (from a to b) is termed the substitution effect and 
reduces the number of children desired. The outward shift of the budget line (from b to c), invokes an 
‘income effect’ and increases household demand for both children and commodities/savings, but the 
new desired number of children (q3) is lower than the initial demand (q1) and the household’s overall 
level of satisfaction is higher. 
We can apply this simple framework to illustrate the effects of religiously related changes in 
preferences on household decision making in this framework. A household that shares the Catholic 
principle against birth control would have a preference in favor of larger number of children; therefore, 
their indifference curves would be more steeply sloped than non-Catholic household (i.e. at a given 
level of utility, greater qualities of commodities of savings would be required for that household to 
offset the decline in utility it would suffer from a reduction in the number of children). This has the 
effect of shifting the equilibrium toward a larger number of desired children and a smaller amount of 
commodities at all price lines and muting the effect of price changes associated with economic 
development in terms of reduced family size (see Figure 6). As the economy develops and the 
opportunity costs of childrearing rise, households’ incentives to decrease their number of children are 
influenced by church doctrine. 



























  16The household’s embrace of the church’s positions changes household preferences and increases the 
number of desired children at the expense of household consumption of commodities/savings. 
 
Figure 6: ‘Catholic preferences’ and the response to price  

































To summarize, lower population growth and economic development can have mutually 
reinforcing effects and demographic research highlights the role of changes in the age composition of 
population in spurring or slowing economic growth.
 9 One contributing factor to the so-called East 
Asian miracle was these economies’ demographic transitions. Evidence supporting the opposing 
proposition (i.e., that higher population growth leads to greater average wealth in non-agricultural 
economies) finds less support in recent empirical research. Population growth appeared to have 
fostered faster economic growth in the aftermath of World War II due to a number of unique 
circumstances of this period. Labor scarcity that prevailed following war-related fertility and 
population declines, the prevailing discrimination against female work outside the home and massive 
labor requirements of the post-war rebuilding task contributed to the positive relationship between 
population growth and economic growth during this time. But with the rise of industrialization and 
 
9   Ironically, many advanced economies—including some East Asian economies—have experienced rapid 
demographic transition and have entered the stage where the problem of declining child bearing threatens 
sustainability of social security system and necessitates government intervention toward increasing incentives for 
having more children.  
  17increased mechanization of manufacturing and agriculture, and the rise in female labor market 
participation, the link between the manpower supply and aggregate output has weakened. 
 
High population growth and labor market conditions in the Philippines 
The Philippines’ high population growth appears to have adversely influenced the country’s labor 
market and productive capacity, and to have contributed to the high and sustained levels of 
unemployment and under-employment in the country. Although the labor force participation rate in 
the country has shown a very slight decline since 1960 (75% of individuals over the age of 15 were 
reported to be in the labor force in 1960 as compared with just under 72% in 2001), the overall 
number of workers in the economy has more than tripled over this period. The Philippines’ 
unemployment rate—measured as employed workers with fewer than 40 hours of work time per week 
that expressed a preference for greater hours—has consistently been the highest among the economies 
considered in this paper, and has displayed a broadly rising trend. In 1980, the figure was 4.8 but the 
latest figure for 2004 is as high as 17.6%.
10  Rates of unemployment and underemployment are 
particularly high among certain segments of the population (e.g., youths aged 15 to 24 suffer 
unemployment at rates that are nearly double those of prime working aged workers).  
Reduced labor absorption that accompanies industrialization appears to have exacerbated the 
surplus labor apparent in the Philippine economy. This conjecture finds support in the figures 
summarized in Table 4, which compares employment elasticity by industry in four Asian economies. 
Estimated employment elasticities indicate the weak labor absorption capacity of the industrial sector, 
particularly in the Philippines and Indonesia. This may suggest that the Philippines and Indonesia 
developed inappropriately capital-intensive industrialization during the years considered on the table. 
The relatively high employment absorption by the service sector in the Philippines may also be 
considered troubling in that service sector employment generally provides less opportunity for value 
adding activities and productivity increasing technical change, and may reflect the large proportion of 
informal service workers in the economy. 
 
                                                      
10 The latest figure is taken from ADB (2005) based on the Philippines labor force survey. 










Agriculture -  0.044  -0.151  0.325  0.115 
Industry  0.148  0.189    0.062    0.048 
(Manufacturing)    0.111    0.145    0.049    0.023 
Service    0.173    0.189    0.298    0.156 
All industries    0.092    0.075    0.228    0.108 
 
(Note) Employment elasticity of the i-th industry is calculated as [G(Li)/G(Yi)]・(Li/L) where  
G(Li) and G(Yi) are the growth rates of i-th industry’s employment and output, respectively,  
and (Li/L) is the employment share of the i-th industry.    (Source) Watanabe, 1996, p.145,  
Table 4-1. 
 
Surplus labor in the Philippine economy may also be reflected in the large number of 
Filipinos who have emigrated or obtain jobs overseas. According to one recent report, more than 7.5 
million Filipinos live or work outside the country (equal to nearly one quarter of the country’s total 
labor force) and sent an estimated $8.54 billion in remittances back to the Philippines in 2004 (Lane, 
2004). Remittances provide a vital source of foreign exchange and helps finance a private safely net 
for families of OCWs. The future availability of employment opportunities abroad for Filipino 
workers appears promising due to population aging in many of the richer economies that currently 
host large numbers of Philippine OCWs. This favorable outlook appears likely despite greater 
competition from would be OCWs from other Asian countries (e.g., China, Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Vietnam) and Philippine workers’ disadvantaged access to some markets that have been large markets 
for Filipino OCWs (most notably Hong Kong).  
 
Negative impact of rapid population growth on savings, investment, and labor productivity 
Slow progress in improving the average level of wealth in the Philippines also appears to have had 
negative implications for the level of domestic savings and investment in the country. Figure 7 shows 
trends in gross savings per capita. It indicates that the Philippines has gone from being the country 
with the highest level of per capita gross savings in 1960 to having among the lowest level of average 
savings in 2001. The decline in average savings was dramatic in the early 1960s, and again in the 
early 1980s, after which time savings rates have been relatively steady. The negative trend in savings 
in the Philippines went against the region’s prevailing trend toward higher per capita savings 
observed before the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-98). It appears that the high population growth has 
provided at least some of the impetus for the fall in savings by necessitating consumption of 
  19economic output to sustain the larger population. Falling savings, in turn, has contributed to the 
country’s decline in investment and labor productivity.  



















































































































China Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand Vietnam
Source: Author's calculations based on data from Asian Development Bank (various years), World Bank (2004), and US Census Bureau (2004).
Notes: Reported constant values of Gross Domestic Savings in Local Currency Units (LCU) were dvidied bu total population and multiplied by the official
exchange rate to derive the statistics displayed in the figure.
 
 
Across the eight countries and 40-year period considered in the figure, higher population 
growth was generally associated with lower per capita savings. There was a -0.275 correlation 
between per capita savings and population growth and the relation was statistically significant (F-test) 
at a 99 percent confidence level. Clearly, other factors including instability in the country’s financial 
system, political instability, and resulting capital flight, also help account for the fall in per capita 
savings, but although FDI and net income from abroad to the Philippines fluctuated over the period, 
these flows appear to only have acted broadly to lessen the decline in gross savings per capita. 
As shown in Figure 8, the higher trend line revealed for the Philippines under the other 
economies’ scenarios suggests the direct effect of high population growth on average savings. 
However, it is important to note that even under the lowest rate of population growth - China’s - the 
broad declining in savings per capita in the Philippines would remain.  
The declining trend in savings and investment has been associated with stagnation in 
Philippine capital formation. As shown in Figure 9, over the past 40 years per capita gross capital 


















































































































Philippines Philippines at China rate of popul. Growth
Philippines at Korea rate of popul. Growth Philippines at Taiwan rate of popul. Growth
Philippines at Thailand rate of popul. growth
Source: Author's calculations based on data from Asian Development Bank (various years), World Bank (2004), and US Census Bureau (2004).
Notes: Reported constant values of Gross Domestic Savings in Local Currency Units (LCU) were dvidied bu total population and multiplied by the official exchange rate to




formation in the country has grown at a lower rate than in any of the neighboring economies. This 
trend has taken the country from being the regional leader in the early 1960s, to having one of the 
lowest levels of per capita gross capital formation today. The positive association between gross 
savings and gross capital formation is borne out by the statistically significant 0.871 correlation 
estimated for the eight economies (1960-2001). 
To the extent that capital markets function well, the level of capital available per worker 
should be closely associated with value added per worker. Accordingly, wages tend to be higher in 
capital-intensive sectors of a given economy and in economies with greater capital stocks. Figure 10 
shows trends in the estimated value added per worker in the industrial sectors of the eight economies 
(1975 to 2001) being considered in the paper. The correlation between value added per industrial 
worker and levels of capital formation is 0.799 and is highly significant statistically. The Philippines 
is the only country in the group to trend lower in terms of its value added per worker during these 
years. Space constraints prevent reporting trends in estimated value added per worker observed for 
the manufacturing, service, and agricultural sectors, but these follow similar trends to that displayed 
in industrial value-added per worker. The Philippine trend seems to reflects the country’s relative 
  21decline in per capita capital formation and underlies the lower growth in GDP per capita during these 
decades. 




















































































































China Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand Vietnam
Source: Author's calculations based on data from Taiwan Statistical Data Book (2004) and World Bank (2003).




In terms of social development indicators, the Philippines has generally performed much 
better in keeping up with the neighboring economies. While laudable, trends showing recurrent and 
rising public deficits and accumulating foreign debt suggest unsustainable levels of debt accumulation 
helped enable the Philippines’ social development success. To satisfy the demands for improved 
public services of a rapidly increasing population in the face of sluggish growth in the economy and 
in public revenues, the government has had to rely on external financing. It is unlikely that the 
government can continue to operate this way—with roughly one-third of public revenues currently 
going to finance debt service payments and a public deficit equaling roughly 4.6 percent of total GDP 
(2003).  
Although social development indicators suggest the Philippines has generally kept pace with 
its neighbors, growth in the population has also put pressure on scarce public resources and made it 
harder for the public sector to deliver quality public services to the growing population. The 
Philippine educational system is a case in point. In the 1950’s it was among the best systems in Asia  













































































































































China Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam
Notes: World Bank (2004) provides data on the total value added of principal sectors of the economy from 1960 to 2001, and total employment and the share of employment in each
sector for 1980 to 2001.  To calculate the average value added per worker for the period 1960 to 2001, the number of workers in each sector and total employment were estimated
for 1960 to 1979 through linear extrapolation of employment shares reported for 1980 to 2001, then the total sector value added was divided by the number of workers in each
sector. Source: Author's calculation based on World Bank (2004).
 
and universities in the country attracted students throughout Asia. Toady, many public primary and 
secondary schools have had to resort to teaching two or even three shifts of students each day in order 
to accommodate all the students. Philippine colleges and universities must now often devote the first 
year of study of new entrants to teach remedial writing and math skills. While Philippine universities 
continue to attract students from abroad, they seem to have lost their position of leadership in the 
region to universities in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and China. 
 
IV. Summary  of  Observations 
The relatively poor performance of the Philippine economy threatens to fuel dissatisfaction and to 
increase support for populist politicians offering more radical policy changes. It also fosters popular 
nostalgia for the country’s relatively favorable economic standing in the 1950s and 1960s and the 
‘strong man’ politics of the Marcos Regime that dominated Philippine politics during those years. 
Post-WWII Philippines federal politics have been dominated by populist personality-based 
leadership, and although the attraction of the country’s voters to populist politicians is certainly not 
  23unique, the presidential campaigns of former-President Estrada and candidate Fernando Poe Jr. 
demonstrated the resurgent strength of populist politicians with Marcos family ties. The electoral 
popularity of such populist candidates and the rejection of more established politicians with clearer 
leadership qualifications can only be helped by the country’s long relative economic decline.  
The analysis in this paper suggests the country’s high rate of population growth has 
contributed to the relatively slow economic development and lackluster improvements in the standard 
of living of Filipinos during the past four decades. Long term trends toward capital dis-investment 
and declining productivity help explain this decline. Public infrastructure appears stretched to 
capacity limits across the Philippines’ growing population (e.g., road infrastructure, quality public 
education, etc.). Worsening fiscal and debt positions have been associated with successive 
devaluations of the Philippine peso, which provide other visible reminders of the country’s relative 
economic decline. 
Corruption and weak governmental institutions certainly play a large role in the Philippines’ 
relatively poor economic record during the past several decades. However, the country shares 
shortcomings in these areas with most of its neighbors, and expansion of the gap between the 
Philippines and its neighbors in the 1980s coincided with the most pronounced division in cross-
country demographic trends.  
The past four decades have seen the Philippines reduce its savings rate and its rate of capital 
formation per worker, deteriorating the economy’s productivity. In particular, lower savings and 
capital formation have led to lower worker productivity in the industrial sector—the sector of the 
economy often credited with spurring the export-led growth of more successful economies in the Asia 
region. Considered in the light, policies to stem rapid population growth in the country appear central 
to the country’s ambitions to spur growth, reduce poverty, and catch up with its neighbors. 
Neighboring countries that have embraced family planning have found it easier to undertake serious 
economic reforms and to achieve sustained high levels of growth capable of steadily improving their 
citizens’ well being. Although family planning policy debacles are numerous in the world, 
experiences of neighbor economies offer examples where public and civil action was successful in 
  24speeding demographic transition. Moreover, the other problems in the Philippines would be easier to 
address, were its population growth rate lower. 
 
V.  Prospects for family planning in the Philippines 
The chief obstacles to promoting family planning in the Philippines are both social and political. An 
estimated 83 percent of the population is self-declared to be Catholic or Protestant (9 percent) and the 
country’s religious leaders from both faiths tend to strongly oppose efforts to promote use of 
contraceptives or other ‘artificial’ methods of family planning. Church involvement in public affairs 
in the Philippines has been longstanding and extensive. It is commonplace for Philippine churches to 
provide politically important election endorsements. For example, in the 1998 Presidential election 
the support of the evangelical churches “El Shaddai” and “Iglesia ni Cristo” were widely credited 
with helping to deliver millions of votes to former-President Estrada. In the 2004 presidential 
election, the Iglesia ni Cristo endorsed Arroyo’s candidacy late in the election. Leaders of other 
churches made public their support of Arroyo through either public appearances or thinly veiled 
statements of support, which undoubtedly helped her to be elected. President Arroyo, like most 
Philippine politicians, is a devoted follower of the Catholic faith and opposed all artificial forms of 
contraception in running for election. In the 2004 presidential election, only candidate Panfilo 'Ping' 
Lacson favored government promotion of family planning, and advocated the adoption of policies to 
encourage families to have no more than two children. He garnered less than 10 percent of the 
popular vote according to exit polls. In light of these political realities, the outlook for efforts at 
family planning in the Philippines seems dire.  
Yet one can point to a number of developments in the Philippines that may suggest brighter 
prospects for family planning in the country. A number of Philippine NGOs have aggressively and 
successfully promoted family planning, and today, many forms of contraception are available at a low 
cost in the country. Filipino families have been increasing their contraceptive use over the past 
several years. So, in some sense, the demand for artificial contraceptives and use of family planning is 
advancing in the country even without government support. For example, Perez and Palmore (1997) 
found there was significant unmet need—above what earlier researchers had found—for family 
  25planning in the Philippines. A 2004 pre-election survey conducted by the Manila-based polling firm 
showed that 82% of the respondents support candidates who favor giving couples a free choice of 
family planning methods. This rate represented an increase of 13 percentage points from the figure 
obtained in a pre-election poll in 2000 (Pulse Asia Inc., 2004).  
The unmet need for family planning in the Philippines is likely driven by the rising 
opportunity cost of childrearing—particularly the opportunity cost of prime working aged females. 
Table 5 shows that female workers in the country generally have equal or superior education than 
men, particularly among workers completing education at the secondary or higher levels. With the 
rising educational attainment of Philippine women, the opportunity costs of child-rearing would 
naturally be expected to lead to “induced evolution” toward institutions and social norms that are 
more accommodating of modern family planning. 
Another positive development, which holds the promise of improving economic prospects for 
the Philippines in coming decades, relates to foreseen increases in the demand for OCWs from the 
country. Recent years have seen the number of OCWs and the value of remittances they send to the 
Philippines rise. Projected population ageing in several of the wealthier economies in East Asia is 
expected to maintain growth in overseas employment opportunities for Philippine workers and help 
alleviate economic pressure from the country’s relatively high rate of population growth. 
Table 5: Education indicators (%) 
  Gross Primary School 
Enrollment Ratio 
Female   Male   (year) 
Gross Secondary School 
Enrollment Ratio 
Female   Male   (year) 
Gross Tertiary School 
Enrollment Ratio 
Female  Male  (year) 
China  114     114     (2000)  64       69     (1999)  6      12   (1999) 
Indonesia  110     112     (2001)  58       58     (2001)  14     16   (2001) 
Korea  102     102     (2001)  91       91     (2001)  61   102   (2001) 
Malaysia  95       95     (2001)  73       66     (2001)  28     26   (2000) 
Philippines  111     113     (2001)  86       78     (2001)  35     27   (2001) 
Taiwan  101     100     (2000)  100       98     (2002)  86     81   (2002) 
Thailand  96      100     (2001)  81       85     (2000)  38     35   (2001) 
Vietnam  100     107     (2001)  67       72     (2001)  9     11   (2001) 
Data source: ADB (2004) 
 
Support for family planning among Philippine business leaders appears to be growing as 
well. A poll of members of the Makati Business Club (2002)—an influential non-profit business 
association in the Philippines—showed 96% of the club’s members were concerned about the size 
and growth of the Philippine population. Ninety percent of business leaders surveyed felt that the 
  26large and fast-growing population was a detriment to the economy and endorsed government policy 
to promote and make available to the public all methods (natural and artificial) of family planning and 
birth control.  
Recent developments in the ecclesiastical community in the Philippines also give modest 
hopes that religious opposition to family planning may be moderating. Philippine Islamic leaders in 
Mindanao recently adopted a “Fatwah” (official ruling) in favor of all methods of contraception. This 
reversed longtime taboos against discussing sexual matters and prohibitions against contraception 
previously understood as emerging from the Koran. What was particularly remarkable about the 
Fatwah was its recognition of the alarming maternal and neo-natal health conditions in impoverished 
Mindanao and the role of family planning in fostering a stronger Muslim nation socially, 
economically, and politically. The retirement of longtime Catholic Cardinal Sin from his post more 
than a year ago has left the Philippine Catholic church without its most recognizable public figure and 
most ardent opponent of family planning. It may also be significant that in the recent election, 
endorsements of key church leaders occurred later in the campaign than in previous elections and 
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